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Abstract—Sidechain technology has been envisioned as a
promising solution to accelerate today’s public blockchains in
terms of scalability and interoperability. By relying on the main-
chain for security, different sidechains can formulate their own
rules to reach consensus. Although the literature has considered
the possibility of using consensus protocols in the sidechain, so
far a tailor-made consensus protocol for sidechains with high
performance and formal security proof has not been attempted.
To fill this gap, we introduce Vulcan, a low overhead, highly
efficient, security provable sidechain protocol. Vulcan makes use
of smart contracts to ensure that only one block proposed in
the sidechain will be enforced on the mainchain in each round,
achieving consensus in an efficient manner. We give formal
specifications of Vulcan which ensures safety and liveness with
f validators (total number of n ≥ 2f + 1) without online
requirement of clients. For security analysis, we give formal
security definitions and proofs under Universally Composable
Security (UCS) model. As a proof of concept, we implement
Vulcan and evaluate it in Ethereum testnet.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a growing academic interest
in the field of blockchain technology, which is the cornerstone
behind cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [28] and Ethereum
[35]. This technology has been envisioned as a trustless and de-
centralized platform on which developers are building various
applications beyond cryptocurrencies. However, today’s public
blockchains (often referred to as permissionless blockchains,
such as Bitcoin and Ethereum) are hindered by many chal-
lenges for web-scale adoption. One of the most fundamental
challenges is scalability, which is caused by blockchain’s na-
ture of decentralization. In a permissionless blockchain, every
node validates every transaction, which consequently imposes
a fundamental limit on the throughput (i.e., the number of
transactions that can be processed per second) [12]. In addition,
since every single move of the execution of a transaction
consumes resources (e.g., storage, bandwidth, computation,
etc.) of the network, the fees charged by miners could be
expensive.
A common approach to scale permissionless blockchains is
to enact transactions “off-chain”, i.e. execute transactions out-
side the blockchain. Off-chain solutions consider the existing
blockchains as the base layer (referred to as “layer 1”), or the
“mainchain”, and arbitrary transaction functions as the upper
layer (referred to as “layer 2”). In order to transfer from layer 1
to layer 2, participants are required to deposit some funds on-
chain so that the money will be frozen on the mainchain and
be “recreated” off-chain. After that, they update their off-chain
status by performing arbitrary transactions following the off-
chain protocols. Malicious behaviors could happen in off-chain
networks, but when this situation happens, participants could
complain to the mainchain by providing justifications which
are verified by the mainchain. Therefore, the mainchain plays
the role of a “judge” by running smart contracts which bridge
the mainchain and the upper protocol. By minimizing the use
of the underlying blockchain itself, this off-chain approach can
achieve “scale-out” throughput as the throughput will increase
as the size of the network grows [32].
A. Motivation
One off-chain proposal is called payment channel networks
(PCN) [31] which enable two users to perform unlimited
transactions off-chain only touching the mainchain during the
deposit and withdrawal process. In a nutshell, two parties
open a payment channel by making some deposits to the
mainchain and then they can do off-chain transactions without
touching the mainchain until they want to close the channel.
Furthermore, even if two users have no direct payment channel
established, they can still pay each other through a set of inter-
mediaries. While numerous contributions have been made to
improve the performance of PCN [27][13][21], they still face
multiple challenges such as costly routing, expensive channel
setup and rebalance requirement. Due to these obstacles, PCNs
are mainly used in peer-to-peer micropayment scenarios.
In this paper, we focus on a different approach called
sidechains [2], which has much wider application scenarios be-
cause it allows any participant to build a sidechain with specific
purpose. Sidechains also share a deposit-withdraw scheme like
PCN, but instead of building a channel between two parties, a
sidechain is a new blockchain with its own rules and two-way
pegged1 with the mainchain. Another difference to PCN is that
in order to guarantee the correctness of the sidechain, block
proposers make commitments to the mainchain periodically,
enforcing the state of the sidechain in the mainchain [18]. To
summarize, a sidechain protocol is essentially a compression
mechanism that periodically executes transactions, persists
state, and anchors it in the mainchain, thereby achieving scale-
out throughput.
Plasma [30] and NOCUST [22] are two of the most promis-
ing sidechain approaches which employ the smart contract
technology to achieve two-way peg. They allow a centralized
operator to manage the sidechain (or “commit-chain” in NO-
CUST) while guaranteeing that users always retain control over
their assets. On one hand, they can achieve the same magnitude
of throughput as centralized fiat payment processing systems,
such as MasterCard and Visa. On the other hand, they ensure
that end-users can always exit the sidechain if the operator is
compromised as long as the mainchain is secure. Despite the
1Two-way peg is a cross-chain mechanism where assets are transferred
between two blockchains at a fixed or deterministic exchange rate [2]
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above two clear advantages, sidechain-based solutions are still
in its infancy, facing several limitations.
• A failure-prone operator. Although the operator can be
trustless, its failure or misbehavior still has critical impact
on user experience. In particular, once the operator is
compromised, so is the sidechain. Users have to perform
mass-exit in order to keep their assets safe, which will
probably cause congestion in the mainchain.
• Withholding attack. This attack, originated from Selfish
Mining, has emerged as a critical attack against PoW-based
blockchains [3] [19] [29], where selfish miners withhold
blocks for unfair mining competition. In the sidechain con-
text, the withholding attack consists of the block proposer
forging an arbitrary block, not propagating it to other nodes,
but making the commitment to the mainchain. From the
mainchain’s perspective, the committed block is always
accepted since it does not verify the correctness of its
content. Current solutions include either instructing the users
to exit the sidechain or forcing the proposer providing the
data through the smart contract. Both two solutions require
users to be online and the latter will involve multiple on-
chain transactions.
• Online requirement. Existing off-chain proposals, including
sidechains and PCN, require the users to be online to receive
the payment or to verify the block at the end of each block
time for trustless operation. Otherwise, sidechain assets
might be stolen. This requirement is impractical to fulfill.
There are some potential solutions such as “watch towers”
[26], where users could outsource their data to a trusted third
party. However, this introduces additional trust assumptions
and costs.
B. Our Solutions and Contributions
In order to address the above issues, we propose to
design new consensus algorithms for sidechains. Although
some existing work [12][30] has discussed the possibility of
consensus mechanisms for sidechain (e.g., PoS, PoA, PBFT,
etc.), a consensus protocol specially designed for sidechains
with formal security proof is still missing in the literature.
To fill this research gap, we present Vulcan: a low overhead,
high efficiency, security provable sidechain protocol. To the
best of our knowledge, Vulcan is the first formal specification
of a sidechain-based protocol with high performance and
rigorous security proof. More specifically, Vulcan2 (i) allows
organizations to run separate sidechains and provides various
off-chain services to their end-users, and (ii) gives a guarantee
to clients that their assets on sidechains are always safe without
online requirement and they can always exit with their coins
back to the mainchain. The key idea behind Vulcan is that
we can leverage mainchain security properties in the design
of sidechain consensus, leading to high-performance protocols
which are previously impossible. Our contributions can be
summarized as follows:
A BFT-based consensus algorithm specially designed
for sidechain. We developed a new algorithm to solve the
well-known Byzantine consensus problem [23] in the sidechain
2Vulcan is a fictional planet of the Star Trek universe. Vulcans, residents
of that planet, are noted for their attempt to live by logic and reason with as
little interference from emotion as possible.
context, where the creation of a block is stricted to a fixed set
of n authority nodes, called validators in our protocol, among
which a maximum of f < n2 can be Byzantine. To avoid
inconsistency, each committed block is enforced on the main-
chain through smart contracts and considered as a checkpoint.
A checkpoint is only considered valid when it is approved
by more than half validators. Thus we adopt the aggregate
signature to assemble multiple signatures, i.e., approvals, from
different validators into a single signature. We also employ a
“lazy-challenge” mechanism to delay the verification of the
checkpoint until some party complains. Since each pending
checkpoint can be viewed on the mainchain, every party can
run the verification locally and request a challenge when they
find the checkpoint is invalid. A validator will be removed out
of the committee if it is successfully challenged. Therefore, in
order to stay in the committee, a block proposer has to reveal
the content of the block to other validators for approval, which
prevents withholding attack.
Safe Cross-Chain Transfer. Apart from consensus algo-
rithms, Vulcan supports safe cross-chain transfer. Users can
easily issue a forward transfer (from mainchain to sidechain)
to join the sidechain since every party can verify on-chain
transactions. However, it becomes complicated vice versa
because of the opacity of off-chain transactions. In Vulcan,
the balances of each user are constructed in a Merkle Patricia
Trie (MPT) with the address as the key and the balance as
the value. Over a block time, the balances are enforced by the
latest checkpoint, which includes the root hash of the MPT.
Our protocol ensures that as long as the security assumption
(n ≥ 2f+1) holds, users can always withdrawal/exit from the
latest checkpoint by submitting the correct merkle path to the
smart contract without online requirement.
Security Model and Formal Proof. To be able to rig-
orously analyze the security properties of our protocol, we
employ a general-purpose definitional framework called the
Universally Composable Security (UCS) framework by Canetti
[10]. By using the UCS framework, we formally define the
security properties of our protocol and provide detailed proof.
C. Outline
Section II presents the system model. Section III describes
the protocol in a high level. Section IV gives a formal
definition of Vulcan under UCS model. Section V evaluates
the performance. Section VI discusses the related work and
Section VII concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section we introduce basic notations, key elements,
communication model, adversary model and assumptions used
in our protocol.
A. Main Elements
Vulcan involves the following roles:
Mainchain: We introduce a tamper-proof and smart con-
tract enabled ledger (e.g., Ethereum) as our mainchain denoted
by MC. In our protocol, MC serves as the base layer, which
keeps all the data including smart contracts, accounts, balances
and transactions.
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Smart Contract: A smart contract is a piece of code
deployed on MC acting as the bridge between MC and
the sidechain (denoted by SC) and providing dispute-solving
services. We use C to denote a set of contracts designated
to a specific SC. In order to meet specific requirements of
different sidechains, each sidechain has a set of exclusive smart
contracts containing a group of functions.
Validators: A set of validators V = {V1, V2, ..., Vn} run
validations and consensus algorithms in SC, where n is the
number of validators. Each of them is identified by a unique
pair of public/private key in the sidechain network. Validators
take turns to propose blocks, one block at an epoch. During
each epoch, the validator who is responsible to propose the
block is called the leader, while the rest are called followers.
The order of rotation is prefixed.
Clients: A set of clients C = {C1, C2, ..., Cm} are actual
users of SC, where m is the number of clients inside SC
network. They can share the same public/private key pair
between MC and SC. Clients issue transactions directly to
validators. In order to increase the success rate of acceptance,
clients can multicast transactions to a group of validators they
trust.
B. Communication Model
We assume our protocol under a synchronous communi-
cation network, where there is a known upper bound on the
message transmission delay. We assume all parties have access
to MC and C, which are always available. All the transactions
sent to MC and C will be finalized within time ∆. We assume
parties can instantaneously acquire the status of MC so that
they are always aware of the current epoch of the protocol.
C. Adversary Model
We consider the adversary can compromise all the clients
and f validators, where f ≤ n−12 . Faulty parties may
deviate from their normal behavior in arbitrary ways, e.g.,
hardware/software crash, nonsensical read and write to MC,
colluding with each other to cheat honest parties, etc. However,
we assume they do not have enough computation power and
money to compromise MC. We also assume that all messages
are signed by their individual senders and adversaries can not
break collision resistant hashes and signatures used both in
MC and SC.
D. Cryptografic Primitives
Our protocol utilizes aggregate signatures which enables
distributed signing among n participants {P1, P2, ..., Pn}. An
aggregate signature scheme consists of four algorithms: Key-
Gen, Sign, Combine, and Verify. The former two algorithms
are the same as the standard signature scheme. Algorithm
Combine takes a vector of n triples (pki, mi, σi) as input,
where pki is the public-key for Ci, mi is the message, and σi
is the signature signed on mi. The output is a single aggregate
signature QA, whose length is the same as a signature on a
single message. Algorithm Verify takes n pairs (pki, mi) and
the aggregate signature QA as input and outputs “True” only
if σ was generated as an aggregate of n valid signatures.
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we present Vulcan from a high-level
overview. Analogous to Ethereum [35], Vulcan is also an
account-based protocol, where each participant has an account
referring to their properties (e.g., balance, non-fungible tokens,
etc.). Therefore, the whole protocol can also be viewed as
a state machine. For simplicity, in this paper, the state only
refers to account balances. The protocol begins with a genesis
state and proceeds by executing transactions periodically until
it terminates.
The sidechainSC is set up by V deploying C on MC,
and any validator can be the owner. The owner of C sets
an endpoint in C indicating when SC will be closed. When
it passes the endpoint, the protocol will halt, after which
users can exit with the balance according to the latest agreed
checkpoint.
In Vulcan, we rely on a fixed set of validators to maintain
SC. After C is deployed on MC, C will keep the public key
as the id of each validator for future verification. Validators
collect signed transactions from clients, execute them, and
package them along with the outcome into a block during each
epoch. The leader of current epoch should propose that block
by broadcasting it to followers. If the leader gets majority of
votes after validators running the mPoA consensus algorithm
(cf. Sec. III-B), then he commits the digest of the block header,
along with a quorum certificate (QC), which is an aggregate
of approvals form followers, to MC via an online transaction
to enforce the state of the epoch. A QC is valid only if it is
an aggregate of more than f signatures on the same hash of
the block header from different validators (including the leader
itself). Meanwhile, the validators publish the whole content of
that block for every parties to query through an API.
A Byzantine leader might propose different blocks at a
time and send them to different followers. In this case, the
leader cannot cause a fork for two reasons: one leader can
only commit once during its tenure and only one block can gain
majority votes since non-faulty validators will not vote for two
different blocks at a time. A validator ignores the inconsistency
in the committed block and the received block as long as the
former gains a valid QC. Another case is that a Byzantine
leader might commit a faulty block without revealing it to
the followers, performing withholding attack. To achieve this
attack, the leader has to obtain an approval from at least one
honest follower (assuming other f validators are compromised)
to generate a valid QC. However, this cannot happen because
an honest validator will not sign an incorrect block.
As for clients, they can always withdraw certain amount
of money or exit with their assets from the latest checkpoint.
Fig. 1 shows a system overview of Vulcan.
A. Epochs
Vulcan proceeds in epochs. An epoch is a slot of time
during which a block is generated from transaction collection
to the acceptance by C. Epochs are numbered consecutively.
Let e denote as the epoch number and l as the index of the
leader of the corresponding epoch such that l = e mod |n|.
Note that a view-change (a new leader to collect transactions
and propose it to followers for a new epoch) happens no matter
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Fig. 1. An overview of transaction flow in Vulcan.
the epoch succeeds or not (more details are described in Sec.
III-B). Each epoch has four terms described as follows:
• Collecting term. Validators collect transactions from clients
during this term. This term starts at the beginning of the
committing term and ends right after the success of last
epoch.
• Proposing term. At the beginning of this term, the leader
l packages the collected transactions from the last term
into a block and proposes it by broadcasting the block
to the followers. If the proposal fails (the leader receives
less than f approvals within a constant time), this round
is abandoned, and a new round (from collecting term) will
begin. Otherwise, the epoch proceeds to the next term.
• Committing term. This term begins by the leader committing
the block to C. After the commitment being confirmed by
MC, the epoch proceeds to the pending term.
• Pending term. During this term, every participant from V
and C can send complaints against the pending commit-
ment, and it is the only term during which C handles
withdrawal/exit requests from clients. If no messages are
received during this term, then the epoch ends and the
pending checkpoint is finalized. Otherwise, the duration of
this term will be increased until the dispute is resolved (after
a certain number of on-chain confirmations). If the challenge
is successful, the current epoch will restart. Otherwise the
protocol proceeds to epoch e+ 1.
Note that two epochs overlap each other to reduce latency
without causing any conflicts. An epoch starts after the end
of the proposing term of the previous one. On the other hand,
the proposing term of the next epoch starts after the previous
epoch ends.
An example of how each epoch proceeds is depicted in
Fig. 2. Epoch 1 shows a normal epoch, which ends in one
round, no malicious events being observed. Epoch 2 starts at
the beginning of the committing term of epoch 1, and the
proposing term of epoch 2 starts after epoch 1 ends. We can
observe that the pending term of epoch 2 lasts longer than that
of epoch 1. This is because the leader might be compromised
and honest followers successfully “challenge” him. Hence,
epochs
time
epoch 1
epoch 2
epoch 3
epoch 4
collecting
period
proposing
period
committing
period
pending
period
Fig. 2. An example of how epochs proceed
following that is a new round of epoch 2. Due to the long
duration of epoch 2, the collecting term of epoch 3 is sustaining
until the epoch 2 ends. However, the first round of epoch 3
fails at the proposing term, so another round comes instead.
Then epoch 4 starts at the beginning of the committing term
of epoch 3 and survives 4 terms in one round.
We can learn from the above example that if every party is
well-behaved, each epoch will only take one round to finish.
Otherwise, it might take several rounds to finish. To ensure
liveness, honest validators will vote out the leader if the epoch
can not finish within certain rounds. We discourage malicious
behaviors by instructing validators to deposit some money as
collateral. If the leader is successfully challenged by more
than f validators, it will be removed from the committee with
monetary punishment. The design of punishment mechanism
is the scope of this paper.
B. BFT-based Consensus
Vulcan adopts a BFT-based algorithm for validators to
reach consensus. Other than tolerate up to n−13 Byzantine
nodes, Vulcan can ensure security and liveness with a max-
imum of n−12 Byzantine nodes. Even though all of the valida-
tors are compromised (the protocol might halt unexpectedly),
Vulcan still guarantees that funds in SC are safe under condi-
tions that clients come online at least once per epoch to verify
their balance (cf. Sec. VIII-A).
In Vulcan, we follow a leader rotation procedure which has
been widely used to fairly distribute the responsibility of block
production among validators [20][1]. The order of validators
taking the lead is predetermined in C before deployed. We
argue that it is nonsignificant how this order is decided. For
example, we could follow the order of validators joining SC.
Once C is deployed, the order is settled unless some validators
are voted out for Byzantine behaviors. The owner of C also
determines a validity time indicating when SC is closed. When
it passes the validity time, the protocol will halt waiting for
clients to exit from the latest checkpoint. Then the funds will
be fairly distributed and SC will terminate. The algorithm
proceeds in epochs which are identified in Fig. 2. Every party
in the sidechain has a global view of who is the leader of
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the current epoch by querying C, and the leader will be
automatically passed to the next one at the end of each epoch.
Algorithm 1 The consensus algorithm at vi
1: Global State:
2: V = {v1, v2, ..., vn}: the set of validators identified
by their public keys
3: current_leader: the public key of current leader
4:
5: Local State:
6: Qtxn = {tx1, tx2, ..., txk}: the set of transactions in
the transaction queue, where k is the total number
7:
8: function PROPOSE():
9: if vi =current_leader then
10: block :=execute(Qtxn)
11: block :=sign(block)
12: broadcast(block)
13: approvals :=receive()
14: QC :=combine(approvals)
15: if approvals.length ≥ n+12 then
16: commit(QC)
17: end if
18: end if
19: end function
20:
21: function DELIVER(block):
22: if verify(block) then
23: approval :=approve(block)
24: approval :=sign(approval)
25: end if
26: send(approval, current_leader)
27: end function
Algorithm 1 shows a simplified version of the consensus
algorithm. We omit details of the verification of transactions
and blocks (e.g., signature, timestamp, balance). Each validator
maintains a transaction queue Qtxn locally. During the collect-
ing term of each epoch, once a validator receives a transaction,
he broadcasts it with a timestamp (indicating which epoch it
belongs to) to the other validators after verifying its valid-
ity3. When the collecting term ends, the leader executes all
transactions in Qtxn and constructs a block with the outcome
(cf. Sec. III-C). Then he proposes that block by broadcasting
it to all the followers (see function propose). On receiving
the proposed block, followers verify its validity (see function
deliver). If that block is correct, the validator approves this
block by sending the leader an approval message which is the
signature on the hash of the block header. If the leader receives
more than f approvals from different validators (including
itself), it aggregates the signatures into a single aggregate
signature and commits it along with the digest of the block to
C to create a checkpoint.
Each checkpoint consists of a hash of the committed
block header, aggregate signature, and a bit index. We use
aggregate signature as a proof that the committed block is
approved by more than half of the validators. The bit index
3Malicious validators may hide transactions or ignore all the transactions
from some particular participants. As such, participants could send their
transactions to multiple validators or choose the one they trust the most.
is an integer, every bit of which represents whether or not
the indexed validator signed the approval. For example, we
have 5 validators in total, indexed by v0, v1, v2, v3, v4. The
bit index of a certain checkpoint is 11 whose binary format
is 01011, meaning that v1, v3, v4 signed the approvals. Let
cpi = {H(Bi), QA(H(Bi)), INDEX} denote the ith check-
point, where H(Bi) is the hash of the header of block Bi,
QA(H(Bi)) is a constant-sized aggregate signature on H(Bi),
and INDEX is an integer which contains the indexes of a list
of validators that signed the QA(H(Bi)). The basic workflow
is as follows:
Aggregation. The leader calls the Combine function to ag-
gregate m signatures on block Bi from m different validators
into one. This signature will convince any verifier that the
exact m validators approved the commitment of the block.
There are several signature constructions to achieve signature
aggregation [24][5][6]. In order to reduce the length of a
checkpoint, we apply the one based on the short signature
scheme of Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham [7].
Verification. We invoke the Verify function to exe-
cute the aggregate verification algorithm, verifying whether
the committed block is actually approved by more than
half of the validators. Given a checkpoint cpi =
{H(Bi), QA(H(Bi)), INDEX} which can be queried from C,
verifiers first find a set of public keys via INDEX, then they
verify that QA(H(Bi)) is a valid aggregate signature on
H(Bi) under the given keys.
We apply a lazy-challenge mechanism to verify the cor-
rectness of each checkpoint. After C receives the commitment,
C will not verify the checkpoint until some party submits a
challenge. Given that all parties can view the content of the
pending checkpoint by querying C, they will run the verifica-
tion algorithm locally. Any party can submit a challenge before
the pending term ends. On receiving a challenge, C will run the
verification algorithm itself to make a binary decision. Either
the leader or the challenger will win, and the loser will be
punished (i.e., loose the bounty), but the details of punishment
mechanism is not the focus of this paper.
In order to ensure the liveness of the protocol, validators
can also submit challenges to vote out a non-responsive
leader. If there is no block proposed or the proposed block
is not committed after a local time-out, a validator can gossip
the challenge message (i.e., essentially a signature) to other
validators, which can be seen as a vote. Anyone who collects
more than f votes aggregates them into one signature and
submits the signature to C and let it decide how to deal with
the leader.
C. Block Construction
A block in our protocol contains all the transactions hap-
pened in SC during a specific epoch4, as well as the updated
states (i.e., balances) after executing those transactions. As
such, a block is a basic unit of a state transition in SC.
More precisely, after a block is published, either all of the
transactions complete (all transactions are computed correctly),
or they fail, and the state of SC remains unchanged.
4Transactions may be assigned to the next epoch due to network latency
and Byzantine validators may arbitrarily discard transactions.
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The design goal of constructing a block in SC is (i) to
include all the information needed for a participant to withdraw
or exit, (ii) that when a participant wants to withdraw or exit,
C should be able to efficiently verify the proof of possession
of the funds, and (iii) that all of the finalized blocks should
follow a strict order according to when they are confirmed in
MC. To fulfill those requirements, Vulcan’s blocks consist of
a list of transactions, a list of updated accounts, along with
the metadata required for verification. Fig. 3 depicts how SC
blocks are constructed and “stitched” onto MC.
1) Block Header: The block header contains metadata
including the epoch number, a hash of the previous block,
the reference of the last checkpoint confirmed on MC, and the
merkle roots of transactions and balances of accounts. The last
checkpoint refers to the hash of the previous block’s header.
The reason to include this field in the block header is to provide
a reference to the last checkpoint, and indicate this block is
published after the previous block is confirmed on MC.
2) Block Body: The block body consists of two merkle
trees, a transaction tree and an account tree. The transaction
tree is a regular Merkle Tree (MT) used in Bitcoin [28], where
hashes of transactions forms leaf nodes and every non-leaf
node is labelled with the hash of its two child nodes. Verifiers
can efficiently and securely verify the existence of a leaf node
in a large data structure by providing a MT proof which is the
path consisting of all the hashes going up from the leaf node to
the root. For the account tree, we introduce the Merkle Patricia
tree (MPT) structure – used in Ethereum [35], to merkleize
the accounts. In the context, the account id is the key and
the balance of the account is the value in the MPT. Verifiers
can efficiently and securely verify the existence of a key and
the correctness of the expected value to the key using a MPT
proof.
D. Withdrawal/Exit
The withdrawal/exit procedure can be viewed as a cross-
chain protocol to transfer assets from SC to MC. This part is
more complex than deposit (i.e., transferring assets reversely)
because the updates in SC are unknown to MC. Therefore,
participants have to provide sufficient proofs to MC about the
funds they want to withdraw.
The difference between a withdrawal and an exit is that a
participant withdraws a certain amount of money equal or less
than the balance without notifying any malicious behaviors
(from a participant’s view), while a participant exit with all
of his money left in SC when some obvious maliciousness
happens. In Vulcan, participants withdraw or exit by sending
a withdrawal/exit request to C containing the value to withdraw
and a Proof of Possession (PoP) which is to prove a participant
owns certain balance of assets in SC. A standard PoP consists
of following components:
• Block Header. It is a regular block header, whose hash
should equal to the checkpoint.
• Balance. The balance of the account at the time of the
checkpoint.
• Merkle Path. It is for C to verify whether the provided
balance matches the expected value in the account tree with
the MPT root included in the block header field.
Now, we start to describe the withdrawal/exit procedure
assuming every party is honest. Parties can only withdraw from
the current epoch. For example, after the proposing term of
current epoch, the latest balance of Ci is x and it wants to
withdraw y coins. Ci initiates the withdrawal by sending a
withdrawal request directly to C containing a withdrawal value
(i.e., y coins), as well as the PoP certifying he is the owner of
x coins. After the verification, C unfreezes y coins on MC and
send them to Ci. On another site, validators are always aware
of the withdrawal. After it is finalized, validators will change
the balance of Ci on SC to x − y and generate a transaction
indicating the balance change which will be included in the
next block. An exit procedure works the same except indicating
the withdrawal value.
If the number of Byzantine validators remains less than
n
2 , we assume that honest validators or clients can address
malicious behaviors by issuing a challenge request (cf. Sec.
III-B), even though the duration of the echo might be longer
than usual. Therefore, participants can always withdraw/exit
through a normal procedure. However, when the number of
Byzantine validators is more than n2 (e.g., all of the validators
are compromised), it means it is no longer safe to stay in
this SC. At this point, end-users can go through an interactive
procedure to exit, but we assume the users would verify their
balances at the end of every epoch (cf. Appendix VIII-A).
IV. FORMAL SECURITY DEFINITION OF VULCAN
A. Modeling Vulcan
In this section, we formally present our sidechain in
the Universally Composable Security (UCS) framework. In
particular, we follow the work of [17] applying a synchronous
version of the global UC framework (GUC) [11], an extension
of standard UC model allowing for a globally available set-
up. Under this model, all the deposits (from MC to SC)
and the withdrawal/exit (from SC to MC) are handled via a
global ideal functionality L(∆), the state of which is globally
accessible by all parties. L(∆) can freely add and remove
money in user’s accounts and the parameter ∆ models that
any interaction with L(∆) has a maximal delay ∆. A full
definition of L(∆) can be found in [16].
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In the UCS framework, a protocol is defined as a set
of computing entities, each representing an actual compo-
nent of the system, including an adversary (which models
all the possible attacks that the protocol may suffer) and
an environment (which models the external interactions that
the protocol may have). The kind of computing entities that
are used are interactive Turing machines (ITMs), which are
basically traditional Turing machines with the added capability
of interchanging information with other machines. Thus, the
system of the present work is modeled as a protocol in the
framework.
For a protocol to fulfill its intended security goals, two
different protocols have to be designed: one representing an
idealized model and one representing a real implementation.
The ideal protocol will encompass all the functionality as a
single entity, operating as desired, either normally or under any
kind of attack. In the real protocol, each element is modeled
as a separate computing entity. The security goal is achieved
if any environment in which the protocol is deployed, cannot
distinguish if it has interacted with the ideal model, or the
realistic implementation.
The concept of distinction between the two protocols has
a concrete definition, in terms of ensembles of probability
distributions. An ensemble of probability distributions is a set
of random variables X = {X(z, k) : z ∈ {0, 1}∗}, i.e., for all
possible choices of z ∈ {0, 1}∗ and k ∈ N, there is a random
variable X(z, k) in the set.
Definition 1. We say that two probability distribution ensem-
bles X and Y are indistinguishable, denoted by X ≈ Y , if for
any a, b ∈ N, there exists k0 ∈ N such that, for any k > k0,
|P (X(z) = 1)− P (Y (z) = 1)| < 1
ka
(1)
with z ∈ {0, 1}λ and λ ≤ kb.
Although this definition is slightly technical, in the con-
text of the UCS framework, it essentially means that any
polynomially bounded machine (PPT) in k (i.e., an ITM that
is computationally bounded by a polynomial of k), cannot
obtain different outputs after performing computations that are
represented by random variables from the ensembles X and Y
(for a given k and z), except with negligible probability, for
an input z whose length is also polynomial in k.
We denote the ideal protocol with I, and the real protocol
with Π. The random variable that represents the output of the
protocol Π in conjunction with an adversary A and an environ-
ment E , with inputs k and z, is denoted by EXECΠ,A,E(k, z).
To avoid complicating the notation, EXECΠ,A,E will represent
the ensemble of probability distributions, for all possible
choices of k and z. With this, we can state our security
definition.
Definition 2. The concept of security of the protocol Π is
achieved if for any adversary A and any environment E , we
can always find an adversary S (typically referred to as the
“simulator”) such that:
EXECΠ,A,E ≈ EXECI,S,E (2)
The ensembles of the execution of the protocol with
environment E and adversary A are indistinguishable from the
ensembles of the execution of the ideal functionality I with
the same environment E and adversary S. Part of the security
proof, is to build a simulator S for any given adversary A.
Whenever the conditions of definition 2 are met, we say that
Π UC-realizes the ideal I.
Theorem 3. There exists a protocol Π, such that it UC-realizes
the ideal protocol I for the ideal funcionality F .
We assume synchronous communication network, where
there is a known upper bound on the message transmission
delay. To simplify the modeling, we assume that the operation
of the protocol proceeds in units. The communication between
any two of four computation entities takes exactly one unit
(e.g., It takes one unit of time for a message sent from some
party to reach C or other parties), while the communication
between entities and the environment E takes zero units. As
we describe the elements of the protocol, we present all the
parameters that they require to work, and the mathematical
notation for them.
B. Security and Efficiency Properties
We emphasize that our scheme provides both safety and
liveness assuming no more than n−12 validators are faulty
without online requirement. Even if the number of Byzantine
validators is more than n2 , our scheme ensures safety by
sacrificing liveness (i.e., the protocol might terminate) and it
requires clients to be online at least once within an epoch
(some techniques like watchtowers [26] can be used). Here,
safety means that all honest parties can always retrieve the
assets from SC to MC. More specifically, safety can be divided
in to the following security guarantees:
Consensus on sidechain update. A proposed block con-
taining transactions happened during a single epoch should
go through a consensus process, where more than a half of
followers should approve that block before it is committed by
the leader. If the committed block does not receive sufficient
approvals, it might be reversed or the whole sidechain will be
terminated.
Guaranteed withdrawal/exit. The end-users of a sidechain
are guaranteed that they can always withdraw a certain amount
of coins less than or equal to the balance, or exit the sidechain
with all the assets from the latest agreed checkpoint.
In addition to safety, we introduce efficient goals by
identifying the duration of an epoch in both optimistic and
pessimistic cases. Every transaction5 sent to MC is handled
in time O(∆) and the consensus time, denoted by τ (much
smaller than ∆), is constantly set according to the use case.
We can see from Fig. 2 that in optimistic case, one epoch can
end in one round, which includes four distinct terms, while in
pessimistic case, it might take several rounds (with limit to 3)
to finish an epoch. Therefore, an epoch ends in time O(∆+τ)
in both optimistic and pessimistic cases.
C. The Ideal Functionality
5Mainly depends on the average block production time of the MC, e.g.,
about 10 min in Bitcoin and 3 min in Ethereum.
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Ideal Functionality F
The ideal functionality F encompass all the functions of V1, . . . , Vn, C1, . . . , Cm, C and L. It communicates with E
via dummy parties V ∗1 , . . . , V
∗
n , C
∗
1 , . . . , C
∗
m. For a fixed time ∆, E gives turns to the clients to make deposits (or join),
make withdraws, exit or challenge the checkpoint. It also gives turns to the validators to also challenge the checkpoint.
(I) Deposit
A. Upon receiving (depositRequest, idC∗i , x) from E :
1) If the timer ∆ has not expired, idC∗m /∈ C∗, and the mainchain balance for that ID is enough, invoke a dummy
machine C∗m for the client, update C∗ := C∗∪{idC∗m}, update the balance for the client B(idC∗i , e) := x and send
(endOfTurn) to E .
2) If the timer ∆ has not expired and idCi ∈ C, send (existingClient) to E .
B. Upon receiving (turnToTalk) for a deposit of an amount x through C∗i :
1) If the timer ∆ has not expired, update the balance for the client B(idC∗i , e) := B(idC∗i , e) + x and send
(endOfTurn) to E through C∗i .
(II) Withdraw/Exit
A. Upon receiving (turnToTalk) for a withdraw of an amount x from E through Ci:
1) If the timer ∆ has not expired, verify if B(idC∗i , e) ≥ x. If so, transfer x to C∗i mainchain account, then send
(endOfTurn) to E . Else send (endOfTurn) to E .
B. Upon receiving (turnToTalk) from E through C∗i for it to exit:
1) If the timer ∆ has not expired, verify if B(idC∗i , e) ≥ x. If so, transfer x to C∗i mainchain account and halt the
machine C∗i . Else, send (endOfTurn) to E .
2) If C∗ = ∅, halt the machines V ∗1 , . . . V ∗n , send (executionEnd, 1) if the remaining balance b = 0 or
(executionEnd, 0) if the remaining balance b 6= 0 and halt. Else, send (endOfTurn) to E .
(III) Transaction
A. Upon receiving (turnToTalk) from E through any C∗i and when timer ∆ has expired:
1) Increase the epoch count e := e + 1, reset the transactions accumulators bsi := 0 and b
r
j := 0, the transactions
queue Qtxn = ∅, reset the transactions count ntxn := 0, reset the transactions timer ttxn and send (Ready) to E
to indicate that the Transactions term has started.
Upon receiving (turnToTransfer) from E through Ci to transfer an amount x to C∗j :
1) Verify if Bl(idC∗i , e) ≥ x. If so, update the accumulators bsi := bsi + x, brj := brj + x, the transactions queue
Qtxn := Qtxn ∪ {txn}, the counter ttxn := ttxn + 1. Repeat this n times to store an internal registry for each
validator.
2) Evaluate if ttxn ≥ tmax or ntxt ≥ nmax. If so, compare the j-th registry against the rest. If more than n2 registries
agree with the j-th, compile the block Be and the checkpoint for the epoch with the information of the j-th registry,
and send (blockReceived) to E . If not, send (ready) to E .
(IV) Pending
A. Upon receiving (blockReceived), E starts giving sequentially the turn to the validators and clients to request
operations. Upon receiving (turnToTalk) from E through V ∗k for a challenge for an invalid checkpoint, and the
timer ∆ has not expired:
1) Remove the wager amount w from V ∗k mainchain account, and use Be−1 to verify if the claim is valid.
2) If the claim is valid, invoke a new machine V ′l to replace V
∗
l (the machine that is the leader of the epoch), updateV := V\{V ∗l }∪{V ′l }, return the wager w to Vk mainchain account, reset the transactions registry B(idC∗i , e) := 0,
B(idC∗j , e) := 0, Qtxn = ∅ and send (ready) to E . Otherwise send (ready) to E
B. Upon receiving (turnToTalk) from E through C∗i , for invalid transaction(s) and the timer ∆ has not expired:
1) Remove the wager amount w from Ci mainchain account, and use PP to verify if the claim is valid.
2) If the claim is valid, invoke a new machine V ′l to replace V
∗
l and update V , return the wager w to C∗i , reset the
n transactions registries bsi := 0, b
r
j := 0, Qtxn = ∅ and send (ready) to E . Otherwise send (ready) to E
C. Upon receiving ANY message and the timer ∆ has expired:
1) Update B(idC∗i , e) := B(idC∗i , e) − x and B(idC∗j , e) := B(idC∗i , e) + x, reset bsi := 0, brj := 0, Qtxn = ∅,
increase the epoch e := e+ 1, j := j + 1 (the leading registry) and send (ready) to E .
Fig. 4. Ideal functionality FL(∆)sc (V,C) for the Sidechain in Vulcan.
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The smart contract only accepts messages during the Commit and Pending terms.
(I) Commit
A. Upon receiving (commit, cpe) to C from any of the validators, Vl:
1) Start a counter for ∆ units of time.
2) Send (blockReceived) to E , for it to sequentially give the turn to make an operation to clients (deposits,
withdraws or challenges) and validators (only challenges), and start the pending term.
(II) Pending
A. Upon receiving (depositRequest, idCi , x) from a client Ci and if the timer ∆ has not expired:
1) Request to L to transfer x from Ci (in the mainchain), by sending the message (depositRequested, idCi , x)
to L.
2) If (cannotDeposit, idCi , x) is received, send (depositNotReceived, x) to Ci and terminate the operation.
3) If (depositConfirmed, idCi , x) is received, send (depositReceived, x) to Ci and to all the validators,
for them to update the balance, and terminate the operation.
B. Upon receiving (depositRequest, idCi , x) from E and if the timer ∆ has not expired:
1) If idCi ∈ C∗, send (existingClient) to E and terminate the operation.
2) If idCi /∈ C∗, request to L to transfer x from Ci (in the mainchain), by sending the message
(depositRequested, idCi , x) to L.
3) If (cannotDeposit, idCi , x) is received, send (depositNotReceived, x) to E and terminate the operation.
4) If (depositConfirmed, idCi , x) is received, send (depositReceived, x) to Ci and to a randomly selected
validator.
C. Upon receiving (withdraw, b, bi,e, hBe−1,MPtxn) from a client Ci and if the timer ∆ has not expired:
1) Verify if the provided elements for the proof of possesion are valid. If the verification is valid, send
(withdrawNotOK, b) to the client, and to a randomly selected validator. Else, send (withdrawOK, Ci, b) to L
and to a randomly selected validator.
2) Update the total balance bt(e) := bt(e)− b, and terminate the operation.
D. Upon receiving (exit, bi,e, hBe−1,MPtxn) from a client Ci and if the timer ∆ has not expired:
1) Verify if the provided elements for the proof of possesion are valid. If the verification fails, send (cannotExit,b)
to the client. Else, update the total balance bt(e) := bt(e) − b, send (clientExit, Ci) to L and a randomly
selected validator.
E. Upon receiving (noClients) from a validator Vk:
1) If the remaining balance b = 0, send (executionEnd, 1) to E and halt.
2) If the remaining balance b 6= 0, send (executionEnd, 0) to E and halt.
F. Upon receiving (challenge, Bk,e−1, w) from Vk and if the timer ∆ has not expired:
1) Send (getWager, w, Vk) to L, to transfer the wager amount w to C, then use Bk,e−1 to verify if the claim is
valid.
2) If the claim is valid, invoke a new machine V ′l and update the validators set V := V \ {Vl} ∪ {V ′l }, send the
message (challengeValid, Vl, V ′l ) to all the validators and L, keep the epoch equal to e, stop the timer and
proceed to the collect term.
3) If the claim fails, update the epoch e := e+ 1, stop the timer and terminate the operation.
G. Upon receiving (challenge, PP,w) from Ci and if the timer ∆ has not expired:
1) Send (getWager, w, Ci) to L, to transfer the wager amount w to C, then use PP to verify if the claim is valid.
2) If the claim is valid, invoke a new machine V ′l and update the validators set V := V \ {Vl} ∪ {V ′l }, send the
message (challengeValid, Vl, V ′l ) to all the validators and L, keep the epoch equal to e, stop the timer and
proceed to the collect term.
3) If the claim fails, update the epoch e := e+ 1, stop the timer and terminate the operation.
H. Upon receiving ANY message and if the timer ∆ has expired:
1) Update the epoch e := e+ 1, and send (epochChanged) to a randomly selected validator.
Fig. 5. The smart contract functionality C
.
This section presents the ideal functionality for the proto-
col. The UCS framework requires that, for the ideal protocol,
the functionality of the whole system to be performed by a
single entity. To keep protocol transparent to any environment
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or adversary, the system must still have computing entities
representing all the elements that are part of the protocol, but
just as ”dumb machines” that forward incoming messages to
the functionality to perform what was requested, and forward
output to the environment E .
A deposit on SC triggers the deployment of the protocol.
We assume that the order of validators passing the leader is
following their indexes, e.g., V0, V1, ..., Vn and starts over.
Lets denote with FL(∆)sc (V,C) the ideal functionality of
the SC, where V is a set with a prefixed number of validators,
C is a set of contracts deployed on the MC and L(∆) is the
mainchain with delay ∆. The ideal functionality communicates
with parties from both C and V .
To keep the model as simple as possible, we exclude
transaction fees in our modeling. The Sidechain functionality
is shown in Fig. 4.
We will explain how the interactions happen in four phases:
(I) Deposit. Parties can join SC or increase their balance by
depositing an amount x via the message depositRequest.
(II) Withdraw/Exit Parties from C can withdraw certain
amount of funds or exit the SC by sending a withdraw or
exit message to the functionality during the pending term
of current epoch. After the verification, the functionality will
restore to the party’s mainchain account the requested amount
(or the total balance). In case of an exit message, the requesting
party machine will halt.
(III) Transaction. The procedure for updating the state
of SC proceeds in epochs which have four distinct terms.
We describe three of them in this phase and the other one
in other phases. (A) During the collect term, parties from C
request transaction trough the depositRequest message
to the functionality. After the correctness is verified, the
states of related parties will be updated accordingly. The
functionality keeps n distinct registries, to emulate the fact
that there are actually n different validators. Considering the
security assumptions, at most n2 −1 of these distinct registries
can be corrupted by te adversary. (B) During the propose
term, the leader of the current epoch proposes the block via
a proposedBlock message. In the functionality, this is
accomplished by selecting the j-th registry, that corresponds
to the leader of the epoch. Then it validates it against the
rest of the registries, and if more than half have consistent
information, then the block is compiled. (C) The functionality
then computes the checkpoint cp to start the commit term,
upon which it sends the blockReceived message to E , for
it to start giving turns sequentially to the clients and validators
to make deposits, withdraws or challenges.
(IV) Pending. Every party can issue a challenge mes-
sage during this term. There two situations where a party
should complain. (i) The current block is not committed within
a fixed amount of time. (ii) The pending checkpoint is wrong.
Specifically, the message of the aggregate signature does not
match the hash of the block header, or the aggregate signature
is not aggregated by sufficient validators. After receiving at
least one challenge message, the functionality will verify
with the proof provided by the client or the validator. If the
challenge is successful, then the leader will be removed from
the committee. Otherwise, the challenger looses its wager.
Now, let us explain how the ideal functionality
FL(∆)sc (V,C) ensures the security and efficiency properties
from Sec. IV-B.
Consensus on sidechain update. Each update in SC cor-
responds to a new block produced and confirmed in MC in
the form of a checkpoint. To reach consensus among honest
validators, the leader has to propose the block and gather
enough votes to commit the block. If the leader does not
receive sufficient votes (i.e., less than f votes), it will give
up this round and start a new one from the collecting term.
After the commitment is confirmed, every party can view the
content of the checkpoint by querying C, which means every
party can run the verification locally. We assume at least one
honest party (including validators and clients) will request a
challenge if the checkpoint is faulty. On receiving at least one
challenge message, the functionality will run the verification
algorithm itself. If the pending checkpoint is detected faulty,
the functionality will clear it, remove the leader from the
committee, and start a new epoch. Therefore, we can see
that this lazy-challenge mechanism ensures that every update
is agreed among honest parties as long as our assumption
(i.e., n ≥ 2f + 1) holds. Given that each interaction with
C is completed in O(∆) units of time and the consensus is
achieved in O(τ) related to the size of V , an update in SC
takes O(∆ + τ) units.
Guaranteed withdrawal/exit. A withdrawal or exit can
happen only during the pending term of each epoch and it
will only be handled until the pending checkpoint survives the
pending term. If the pending checkpoint is obliterated after
the pending term, the end-user has to wait for next round.
A withdrawal/exit request can only be handled in the latest
checkpoint (the pending one). After the request is approved
by C, the requested number of coins will be added to the
requester’s account within ∆ units of time. The correctness
of the withdrawal/exit is ensured by the former property since
each checkpoint is agreed among honest validators.
D. The Sidechain Protocol
The functionalities of the machines that perform the main
functions in the protocol, are presented in Fig. 5 and Fig.
6, for the Smart Contract C and the validators V1, . . . , Vn,
respectively. A brief summary of the protocol is presented
now. The reader can refer to Appendix VIII-B, for a detailed
description of the UCS model of the protcol.
The protocol starts when the environment machine E
requests a deposit when there is no protocol running yet. Upon
this, the smart contract C, the validators V1, . . . , Vn and the
first client V1 machines are invoked. After this, more clients
can join by requesting deposits to C, which transfers money
from the mainchain to the sidechain, for the client to use
for internal transactions. The protocol is divided in epochs
as described in section III-A, and that division is mirrored in
model.
After a client joining the network, it can request to transfer
money to other clients, to pay for goods or services in a quick
manner. This is made through a request to any Vl ∈ V . In
the collecting term, validators receive all the transactions that
the clients request, and store them. Once a certain period has
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(I) Collect
A. Upon receiving (transferFunds, (Ci, Cj , b), si,j,b) from any client Ci,
1) If Ci = Cj , discard and send (ready) to E .
2) If Ci 6= Cj , verify if V ((Ci, Cj , b), si,j,b, ki) = 1 and B(idCi , e) > b. If so, set bsi := bsi + b, brj := brj + b,
Qtxn(e) := Qtxn(e) ∪ {txl} and ntxn := ntxn + 1. Otherwise, send (txNotValid) to the client Ci and send
(ready) to E .
3) Send (txRequest, (Ci, Cj , b), si,j,b) sequentially to all the other validators.
4) Upon receiving the last (txAck) or (txNotAck), evaluate if ntxn ≥ nmax or ttxn ≥ tmax. If true, send
(compile) to the leader. Otherwise (ready) to E .
B. Upon receiving (txRequest, (Ci, Cj , b), si,j,b) from other validator,
1) If V ((Ci, Cj , b), si,j,b, ki) = 1 and B(idCi , e) > b, update b
s
i := b
s
i + b, b
r
j := b
r
j + b, Qtxn(e) := Qtxn(e)∪{txl}
and ntxn := ntxn + 1, and send (txAck) to the sender. Otherwise send (txNotAck) to the sender.
(II) Propose
A. Upon receiving (compile):
1) Compute hBe−1 , MTtxn and MTP , the tuple Be (the block), and sBe,l (the signature).
2) Send (proposedBlock, Be, sBe,l) to the rest of the validators, sequentially.
3) After the last validator reply (or if the response timed out), proceed to the commit term.
B: Upon receiving (proposedBlock, Be, sBe,l) from validator Vl
1) Use Be and sBe,l to verify the validity of the block. If the check is positive, send (blockApproved, sBQ , l
′)
to Vl. Otherwise send (blockNotApproved).
(III) Commit
A. Upon receiving the reply from the last validator for the block proposal (or if the last reply wait timed out):
1) If approval replies are more than n2 compute H(Be), QA(H(Bi)) and index and send (commit, cpe, index) to
the rest of the validators and C.
2) If approval replies are less than n2 , set ntxn := 0, restart the timer ttxn = 0 and reset the internal parameters for
collecting transactions, bsi := 0, b
r
j := 0 and Qtxn(e) = ∅, send (epochRestart) to the rest of the validators
and E and send (ready) to E .
B. Upon receiving (epochRestart),
1) set ntxn := 0, bsi := 0, b
r
j := 0 and Qtxn(e) = ∅, restart the timer ttxn = 0 and send (restartAck).
(IV) Pending
A. Upon receiving (depositReceived, idCi , x):
1) If sender is E , if idCi /∈ C∗, then invoke a machine for that client, update C∗ := C∗ ∪ {idC〉} and B(idCi , e) = 0,
else send (existingClient) to E .
2) If sender is any client Ci, update the balances B(idCi , e) := B(idCi , e) + x, and send (endOfTurn) to E .
B. Upon receiving (withdrawOK, Ci, x) (or (withdrawNotOK, Ci, x)) from C:
1) If withdrawOK, update B(idCi , e) := B(idCi , e)−x, and inform the validators, then send (endOfTurn) to E ,
else send only (endOfTurn) to E .
C. Upon receiving (clientExit, Ci, x) from C:
1) Update clients set C := C \ {idCi}.
2) If C = ∅, verify if V 6= ∅, if so send (clientExit, Ci, x) to a another randomly selected validator and halt,
else send (clientExit, Ci, x) to all the validators and then (endOfTurn) to E .
3) If C = ∅ and V = ∅, send (noClients) to C and halt.
D. Upon receiving (turnToTalk) from E :
1) If cpe is invalid, send (challengeCP, Bk,e−1, w) to C, otherwise send (endOfTurn) to E .
E. Upon receiving (challengeValid, Vl, V ′l ) from C:
1) Reset the transaction registry, bsi = 0, b
r
j = 0, Qtxn(e) = ∅ to restart the epoch and send (ready) to E .
2) If the ID of Vl corresponds to its own ID, send (ready) to E and halt.
E. Upon receiving (epochChanged) from C or a validator:
1) Update the transactions registry B(idCi , e+ 1) := B(idCi , e) + b
r
i − bsi for all i ∈ {1 . . .m}.
2) If the sender is C, send (epochChanged) to the rest of the validators and then send (ready) to E .
Fig. 6. Functionality for the Validators V1, . . . , Vn.
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passed, or a certain number or transactions have been accu-
mulated, the propose term begins. In this term one validator
takes the lead to compile all the transactions into a block, and
propose it. When all the validators have replied to the request
for approval (or a fixed timeout has passed), then the commit
term begins. In this term, if more than half of the validators
approved the block, then the leader generates a QC of the block
and submits it to C, after which the pending term begins. If
the block fails gaining enough approvals, the protocol returns
to the collecting term, and all transactions are discarded. In the
pending term, the smart contract is open to receive challenges
to the received checkpoint. Also during the pending term,
clients can ask for making deposits or withdraws, or to exit.
The validators and clients are sequentially queried by E if they
need to request any those operations.
Finally, the protocol execution ends when there are no more
clients in the sidechain. When the last client is in the network,
and it request to exit, if the withdraw operation for the rest of
its balance is successful, the protocol ends and all the machines
halt. The details of the security proof is given in Appendix
VIII-D.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the feasibility and performance of the
protocol and the underlying smart contracts, we constructed a
simple proof of concept implementation of Vulcan. The smart
contract is written in Solidity (around 800 LoC) and deployed
in Ethereum Kovan testnet. We also implemented the code of
the validator side using Golang (around 1900 LoC) and the
client side using Python (around 800 LoC).
An important criteria to evaluate smart contracts running
over the Ethereum is the cost of gas, which is the fundamental
unit of computation in the Ethereum. The fees of any given
fragment of programmable computation are universally agreed
in terms of gas. Thus we can use the amount of gas to
fairly measure the cost of each transaction. Note that we
only give run-time cost of our protocol without considering
the deployment cost because it is easy to optimize gas costs
by extracting all functionality of the smart contract into an
external library.
A. Constant Gas Cost
There are two types of transactions, deposit and checkpoint,
having constant gas cost, which means no matter how the
number of validators and clients increases, the gas cost of these
transactions remains unchanged because they send constant
size of data. The exchange rate of gas to ether is determined
by GasPrice, which is freely chosen by the sender of the
transaction. Higher GasPrice means more incentive for miners
to mine that transactions, which leads to shorter latency. In our
experiment, we choose an average rate, GasPrice= 4 gwei (1
gwei = 10−9 Ether), under which the mean time to confirm a
transaction is approximately 20 minutes. We use the exchange
rate of 267 between Ether and US dollar6.
Constant costs of deposit and checkpoint are list in Table
I. We observe that it only takes 0.023 USD to issue a deposit
and the gas cost 21,912 is slightly more than that of a basic
6According to the exchange rate as of 31 May, 2019
TABLE I. CONSTANT COSTS OF DEPOSIT AND CHECKPOINT.
Type of transactions Bytes Gas ETH (gwei) USD
deposit 4 21,912 87,600 0.023
checkpoint 98 272,324 1,089,300 0.289
transaction (the gas cost of a basic value-transfer transaction is
fixed to 21,000 gas). A checkpoint consists of the hash of the
block header (32 bytes), an aggregate signature (65 bytes) and
an index number (1 byte). And it takes 272,324 gas (approx.
0.289 USD) for a leader to submit a checkpoint. The duration
of an epoch can be adjusted according to the actual use case.
For example, a sidechain updates its state hourly (approx. 1
checkpoint for one hour, excluding epoch fails). Then it takes
about 7 USD a day, and 2540 USD a year to maintain this
sidechain.
B. Scalability
1) Withdrawal/exit cost: As the size of clients scales up,
the cost of a withdrawal/exit increases because the client needs
to submit a longer merkle path as the proof of possession
(Merkle proof) of the withdrawal/exit. Each withdrawal/exit
consists of a key (the address of the requester, 20 bytes), a
value (the balance, 4 bytes), a root hash (the hash of the merkle
trie, 32 bytes), a branch mask (a “roadmap” to the root node,
1 byte), and an array of siblings (adjacent nodes along the
merkle path, 32 bytes). The number of siblings grows with m
clients in O(logm), which is the major cost when the size of
the clients becomes large. We measured the withdrawal/exit
cost as the size of clients grow in incremental steps (cf. Fig.
7). During each step, we randomly instructed one client to
issue a withdrawal/exit transaction to C, recorded the number
of siblings included in the transactions and the gas cost.
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Fig. 7. Gas cost as the number of clients increases.
We can observe that the gas cost grows in the same pattern
as the number of siblings grows. During the first 2,000 steps,
the gas cost surges to around 80,000 (approx. 17 siblings) and
then, for the rest of steps, the speed of growth slows down.
When the size of clients came to 10,000, the gas cost only
increased to around 90,000 (approx. 20 siblings). Using the
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same GasPrice and the exchange rate, we can calculate that
it only costs about 0.1 USD for a user to withdraw/exit in
a sidechain network with 10,000 clients. Based on the above
observation, we can easily estimate the cost of withdrawal/exit
when the size of clients scales up to one million. For example,
if one million clients joined the sidechain, a client would
include 20 siblings in a withdrawal/exit transaction, which
would cost 140,000 gas approximately (approx. 0.15 USD).
2) Aggregate verification cost: Our protocol applies a
“lazy-challenge” scheme where C will not run the verifica-
tion of the pending checkpoint until some party submits a
“challenge” request. There are two types of challenges: (i)
a challenge named challenge-ncp complaining the leader for
not committing the checkpoint, (ii) and a challenge named
challenge-cp complaining the pending checkpoint (faulty ag-
gregate signature). The former requires parameters including
an aggregate signature assembled by the challenger and an
index number, while the latter requires no parameters. Both
two types of challenges will trigger C running the verification
of aggregate signature. We implemented BGLS aggregate
signature [6] in Solidity based on an existing codebase7.
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Fig. 8. Gas cost as the number of validators increases.
Fig. 8 showed the gas cost of the aggregate verification as
the number of validators increases. We can see that the gas
cost (triggered by challenge-cp) grows linearly with the val-
idator number from 334, 659 with 10 validators to 7, 723, 091,
approx. 0.327 USD to 7.546 USD (gas cost triggered by
challenge-ncp from 338, 953 with 10 validators to 7, 727, 248,
approx. 0.331 USD to 7.542 USD because of additional
parameters). This is because when the number of validators
grows, the complexity of the verification increases linearly.
Note that the validator number is limited even though we
ignore the monetary cost, because there is a gas limit which
defines all the transactions inside a block allowed to consume
in Ethereum. However, the gas limit can be adjusted by the
miner due to the congestion, which is about 8, 000, 000 on
average.
7https://github.com/Project-Arda/bgls-on-evm
VI. RELATED WORK
The idea of off-chain scaling originated from Lightening
Network [31], which has emerged as the most promising
PCN practice for Bitcoin, followed by Sprites and Raiden
for Ethereum. There exist extensive literature proposing con-
structions to improve PCN. Revive [21], Spider [33] , and
Flash [34] propose dynamic routing algorithms to maximize
the throughput and success volume of PCN, while Perun [13]
introduces virtual payment channels to avoid the involvement
of the intermediary for each individual payment, thereby,
significantly reducing communication complexity.
In contrast to channels between two parties, sidechain-
based approaches allow parties in a sidechain network to
freely perform transactions without a prebuilt channel. A first
sidechain-based scheme that enables off-chain transactions is
Plasma [30], which allows arbitrary consensus algorithms in
the sidechain. The consensus mechanism enforces the rules
encoded in the smart contract, through which disputes can are
resolved fairly. Therefore, as long as the mainchain remains
secure, the safety is ensured in the sidechain even if the
consensus mechanism is compromised. Two main challenges
of current plasma constructions [8][9] are the size of proofs
and cumbersome withdrawal/exit procedure.
A very interesting construction similar to ours is called
NOCUST [22], which is an account-based commit-chain,
where a single operator maintains users’ account and commits
checkpoints at regular intervals. NOCUST is a challenge-
response protocol, where users can issue different types of
challenges directly to the smart contract to mediate. As such,
it requires users to be online at least once within a block
time, or a malicious operator might manipulate users’ balances.
NOCUST also utilize zkSNARK [4] in its smart contract which
enables efficient verification of the complete correctness of
checkpoints. A major difference between NOCUST and Vul-
can is that our protocol features a PoA-based consensus which
ensures safety and liveness without online requirement under
appropriate security assumption. We argue that by introducing
a consensus mechanism over a small-sized committee in the
sidechain can mitigate single-point-failure and improve user
experience.
Recent literature finds that UCS framework has been
widely used to prove the security of off-chain solutions
[27][13][17][14][15][25]. Given the serious monetary loss
when off-chain protocols are massively applied, we suggest
that the security of each off-chain protocol should be formally
proved.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduced Vulcan, a sidechain-based
off-chain protocol for public blockchains achieve scale-out
throughput without sacrificing security. We developed mPoA
for validators to achieve consensus in the sidechain which
ensures liveness and safety with a maximum of f < n2
validators being Byzantine. We utilized aggregate signature to
generate each checkpoint whose validity will only be verified
by the smart contract when some party some party. One
advantage of Vulcan is that as long as the security assumption
holds, clients can always remain offline without worrying
assets loss. We defined the security of our protocol in the
13
UC framework and provided formal proofs. The performance
evaluation shows that Vulcan is practical and scalable in terms
of monetary cost: around 0.289 USD for each checkpoint and
0.15 USD for each withdrawal in the order of million users.
For future work, we plan to extend our off-chain model to
support executing smart contracts.
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VIII. APPENDIX
A. Interactive Exit
Interactive exit is to handle situations where (i) the current
epoch is in the pending term, but they have not received the
block from any of the validators; (ii) the received block does
not match the checkpoint; and (iii) the received block can
match the checkpoint, but it has conflict with the local view.
When participants or honest validators have the above observa-
tions, they should initiate an interactive exit to compulsively
demand the leader to provide C with sufficient evidence to
resolve the dispute. The core idea behind the interactive exit
is to instruct C to recalculate the balance of a participant
based on that of the last checkpoint (we assume the balance
of that participant is correct in the last checkpoint) and the
transactions happened during the current epoch and related to
that participant.
C
<latexit sha1_base64="suMAjzvrV6PKJ8xgZIZaI Z+9Q9g=">AAAB8nicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vqks3wSK4KjNV0GWxG5cV7AOmQ8mkmTY0kwzJHaEM/Qw3LhRx69e 482/MtLPQ1gOBwzn3knNPmAhuwHW/ndLG5tb2Tnm3srd/cHhUPT7pGpVqyjpUCaX7ITFMcMk6wEGwfqIZiUP BeuG0lfu9J6YNV/IRZgkLYjKWPOKUgJX8QUxgQonIWvNhtebW3QXwOvEKUkMF2sPq12CkaBozCVQQY3zPTSD IiAZOBZtXBqlhCaFTMma+pZLEzATZIvIcX1hlhCOl7ZOAF+rvjYzExszi0E7mEc2ql4v/eX4K0W2QcZmkwCRd fhSlAoPC+f14xDWjIGaWEKq5zYrphGhCwbZUsSV4qyevk26j7l3VGw/XteZdUUcZnaFzdIk8dIOa6B61UQdR pNAzekVvDjgvzrvzsRwtOcXOKfoD5/MHdKaRXQ==</latexit>
or
pi
<latexit sha1_base64="d859ofo0ri5GbQo8/CJ8f1zry30=">AAAB6nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0mq oMeiF48V7Qe0oWy2k3bpZhN2N0IJ/QlePCji1V/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3NreJ2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTcCO4lCGgUC28H4dua3n1BpHstHM0nQj+hQ8pAzaqz0kPR5v1xxq+4cZJV4Oal Ajka//NUbxCyNUBomqNZdz02Mn1FlOBM4LfVSjQllYzrErqWSRqj9bH7qlJxZZUDCWNmShszV3xMZjbSeRIHtjKgZ6WVvJv7ndVMTXvsZl0lqULLFojAVxMRk9jcZcIXMiIkllClubyVsRBVlxqZTsiF4yy+vklat6l1Ua/eXlfpNHkc RTuAUzsGDK6jDHTSgCQyG8Ayv8OYI58V5dz4WrQUnnzmGP3A+fwBVro3U</latexit>
vj
<latexit sha1_base64="NTdRu9gr5WzMaeiMCHryZHiPDUA=">AAAB6nicbVDLTgJBEOzFF+IL9ehlIjHxR HbRRI9ELx4xyiOBDZkdZmFkdnYz00tCCJ/gxYPGePWLvPk3DrAHBSvppFLVne6uIJHCoOt+O7m19Y3Nrfx2YWd3b/+geHjUMHGqGa+zWMa6FVDDpVC8jgIlbyWa0yiQvBkMb2d+c8S1EbF6xHHC/Yj2lQgFo2ilh1H3qVssuW V3DrJKvIyUIEOtW/zq9GKWRlwhk9SYtucm6E+oRsEknxY6qeEJZUPa521LFY248SfzU6fkzCo9EsbalkIyV39PTGhkzDgKbGdEcWCWvZn4n9dOMbz2J0IlKXLFFovCVBKMyexv0hOaM5RjSyjTwt5K2IBqytCmU7AheMsvr5JG pexdlCv3l6XqTRZHHk7gFM7Bgyuowh3UoA4M+vAMr/DmSOfFeXc+Fq05J5s5hj9wPn8AYFaN2w==</latexit>
Balance(k   1, pi)
<latexit sha1_base64="VdCoNwmiidMbDkR9ewWW4ILv+6I=">AAAB+XicbVBNS8NA EN3Ur1q/oh69LBahgpakCnos9eKxgv2ANoTJdtMu3WzC7qZQQv+JFw+KePWfePPfuG1z0OqDgcd7M8zMCxLOlHacL6uwtr6xuVXcLu3s7u0f2IdHbRWnktAWiXksuwEoypmgLc0 0p91EUogCTjvB+G7udyZUKhaLRz1NqBfBULCQEdBG8m27ARwEoZXxpXuR+Ozct8tO1VkA/yVuTsooR9O3P/uDmKQRFZpwUKrnOon2MpCaEU5npX6qaAJkDEPaM1RARJWXLS6f4T OjDHAYS1NC44X6cyKDSKlpFJjOCPRIrXpz8T+vl+rw1suYSFJNBVkuClOOdYznMeABk5RoPjUEiGTmVkxGIIFoE1bJhOCuvvyXtGtV96pae7gu1xt5HEV0gk5RBbnoBtXRPWqiF iJogp7QC3q1MuvZerPel60FK585Rr9gfXwDx3+Scw==</latexit>
MP (k, pi)
<latexit sha1_base64="4Ie+dobLGWT0 Y2H+tYUngvmpbOc=">AAAB8HicbVBNSwMxEJ2tX7V+VT16CRahgpTdKuix6MWLUMF+SL uUbJptQ5PskmSFsvRXePGgiFd/jjf/jWm7B219MPB4b4aZeUHMmTau++3kVlbX1jfym 4Wt7Z3dveL+QVNHiSK0QSIeqXaANeVM0oZhhtN2rCgWAaetYHQz9VtPVGkWyQczjqkv8 ECykBFsrPR4Vy+PzuIeO+0VS27FnQEtEy8jJchQ7xW/uv2IJIJKQzjWuuO5sfFTrAwj nE4K3UTTGJMRHtCOpRILqv10dvAEnVilj8JI2ZIGzdTfEykWWo9FYDsFNkO96E3F/7xO YsIrP2UyTgyVZL4oTDgyEZp+j/pMUWL42BJMFLO3IjLEChNjMyrYELzFl5dJs1rxzivV +4tS7TqLIw9HcAxl8OASanALdWgAAQHP8ApvjnJenHfnY96ac7KZQ/gD5/MHioSPlQ= =</latexit>
Transactions(k, pi)
<latexit sha1_base64="Z/57YfueKe3w2Ono07EwSpVz1Jg=">AAAB/H icbVDLSsNAFL3xWesr2qWbYBEqSEmqoMuiG5cV+oI2hMl00g6dTMLMRAih/oobF4q49UPc+TdO2iy09cCFM+fcy9x7/JhRqWz721hb39jc2i7tlHf39g 8OzaPjrowSgUkHRywSfR9JwignHUUVI/1YEBT6jPT86V3u9x6JkDTibZXGxA3RmNOAYqS05JmVtkBcIpy/ZG16EXv03DOrdt2ew1olTkGqUKDlmV/DUY STkHCFGZJy4NixcjMkFMWMzMrDRJIY4Skak4GmHIVEutl8+Zl1ppWRFURCF1fWXP09kaFQyjT0dWeI1EQue7n4nzdIVHDjZpTHiSIcLz4KEmapyMqTsE ZUEKxYqgnCgupdLTxBQmeh8yrrEJzlk1dJt1F3LuuNh6tq87aIowQncAo1cOAamnAPLegAhhSe4RXejCfjxXg3Phata0YxU4E/MD5/AElflIY=</late xit>
Transactions0(k, pi)
<latexit sha1_base64="NAopDGQY VYfW9y8v2big3P6bX44=">AAACBXicbVDLSgMxFM3UV62vUZe6GCxCBSkzV dBl0Y3LCn1BOw6ZNNOGJpmQZIQydOPGX3HjQhG3/oM7/8ZMOwutHrhwcs695 N4TCkqUdt0vq7C0vLK6VlwvbWxube/Yu3ttFScS4RaKaSy7IVSYEo5bmmiK u0JiyEKKO+H4OvM791gqEvOmngjsMzjkJCIIaiMF9mFTQq4gyl7qLu0LSRi eVsanIiAngV12q+4Mzl/i5aQMcjQC+7M/iFHCMNeIQqV6niu0n0KpCaJ4Wuo nCguIxnCIe4ZyyLDy09kVU+fYKAMniqUprp2Z+nMihUypCQtNJ4N6pBa9TP zP6yU6uvRTwkWiMUfzj6KEOjp2skicAZEYaToxBCJJzK4OGkFpQjHBlUwI3 uLJf0m7VvXOqrXb83L9Ko+jCA7AEagAD1yAOrgBDdACCDyAJ/ACXq1H69l6s 97nrQUrn9kHv2B9fAO0fJiv</latexit>
MP (k   1, pi)
<latexit sha1_base64="57v+owiIFJKFdXA3aj0mS8hIB+M=">AAAB8nicbVBNSwMx EJ2tX7V+VT16CRahgpbdKuix6MWLUMF+wHYp2TRtQ7PJkmSFsvRnePGgiFd/jTf/jWm7B219MPB4b4aZeWHMmTau++3kVlbX1jfym4Wt7Z3dveL+QVPLRBHaIJJL1Q6xppwJ2jD McNqOFcVRyGkrHN1O/dYTVZpJ8WjGMQ0iPBCszwg2VvLv6+XRuXcWd9lpt1hyK+4MaJl4GSlBhnq3+NXpSZJEVBjCsda+58YmSLEyjHA6KXQSTWNMRnhAfUsFjqgO0tnJE3RilR 7qS2VLGDRTf0+kONJ6HIW2M8JmqBe9qfif5yemfx2kTMSJoYLMF/UTjoxE0/9RjylKDB9bgoli9lZEhlhhYmxKBRuCt/jyMmlWK95FpfpwWardZHHk4QiOoQweXEEN7qAODSAg4 Rle4c0xzovz7nzMW3NONnMIf+B8/gBnWJAH</latexit>
,
leaderk
<latexit sha1_b ase64="6Pk2IO6FxFE5k/5wBtVmvU M5ulQ=">AAAB73icbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1 q/qh69LBbBU0mqoMeiF48V7Ae0oWw 203bpZhN3N0IJ/RNePCji1b/jzX/j ts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19 Y3NreJ2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLG LVCahGwSU2DTcCO4lCGgUC28H4dua3 n1BpHssHM0nQj+hQ8gFn1FipI5CGq PrjfrniVt05yCrxclKBHI1++asXxi yNUBomqNZdz02Mn1FlOBM4LfVSjQl lYzrErqWSRqj9bH7vlJxZJSSDWNmS hszV3xMZjbSeRIHtjKgZ6WVvJv7ndV MzuPYzLpPUoGSLRYNUEBOT2fMk5Aq ZERNLKFPc3krYiCrKjI2oZEPwll9e Ja1a1buo1u4vK/WbPI4inMApnIMHV 1CHO2hAExgIeIZXeHMenRfn3flYtB acfOYY/sD5/AEe/JAF</latexit>
Fig. 9. The procedure of the interactive exit.
A more specific procedure of interactive exit is illustrated
in Fig. 9. In the pending term of the epoch k, Ci or vj
issues an interactive exit by providing Balance(k−1, Ci) and
MP (k − 1, Ci) (an honest validator and issue the interactive
exit in place of Ci since we assume that participants are not
always online), which are the balance of Ci enforced at the
epoch k−1 and the corresponding merkle path. After C verify
the request, it will demand the leaderk to respond to the
request with the merkle path of Ci at the epoch k within time
∆ otherwise the mass exit. If the leaderk successfully submit
MP (k,Ci), then within the next time ∆, both of them can
send Transactions(k,Ci) to C, where Transactions(k,Ci)
refers to a set of transactions issued during the epoch k , related
to Ci and signed by both leaderk and Ci. The purpose of this
step is that both of them might hide some transactions for their
interest. After this step, C will calculate a new Balance(k,Ci)
based on the received evidence. If Balance(k,Ci) cannot
match the current checkpoint with MP (k,Ci) provided by
the leaderk, then the mass exit will be triggered. Otherwise,
at the end of current pending term, Ci will exit with the
Balance(k,Ci) unless someone triggers the mass exit before
that.
B. UCS Framework Model
The protocol Π is built with 4 computing entities that
perform different functions:
• Validators (denoted by V1, V2, . . . , Vn)
• Clients (denoted by C1, C2, . . . , Cm)
• Global Ledger (denoted by L)
Fig. 10. Protocol Π model.
• Smart Contract (denoted by C)
Each one of these entities are identified with a unique
ID. The basic construction of the protocol is depicted in Fig.
10 (only all the communication paths for V1 and C1 are
depicted for simplicity, showing 2 clients and 4 validators).
We denote as V = {V1, V2, . . . , Vn}, the set of validators, and
C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm} the set of clients.
The following are the functional description of each of the
elements listed above. As we describe them, we present all
the parameters that they require to work, and the mathematical
notation for them.
1) Validators: The validators are nodes that clients request
transactions to. They are responsible for collecting and storing
the transactions that the clients send, and compile the blocks
that containins the accumulated transactions during the epochs,
for the other validators to collectively approve.
During the execution of the protocol, validators can take
one of two different roles: leader or follower. When a certain
amount of transactions are accumulated, or a certain amount
of time has passed (parameters that we can assume are fixed
prior the start of the protocol), one of the validators take the
responsibility of carrying out the process of compiling the
transactions into a block. This validator is the leader of the
epoch. The rest of the validators are followers, which are only
responsible of receiving the block compiled by the leader,
and approve it, if the information contained corresponds to
its internal registry, or disaprove if not.
The validators parameters are the following. First, there
are two read only numbers, that are the maximum amount of
transactions per epoch, nmax, and the maximum time duration
for an epoch tmax. There is an index number vindex, which has
the order number in which the particular validator is picked
to be leader, and a number vn that gives how many validators
are in the sidechain. There is also a binary flag vstatus which
indicates the status of the validator, 1 if it is the epoch leader or
0 if is a follower. For syncrhonization purposes, all validators
are aware of the current leader by vcurrent, this parameter is
set to 1 at the beginning of the execution, increases whenever
an epoch starts, and goes back to 1 if it goes greater than
n. Whenever vcurrent = vindex, then vstatus = 1, otherwise
vstatus = 0. The validators control the number of transactions
of the current epoch with ntxn, and ttxn is a timer with
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the duration of the current epoch; both numbers are set to
0 at the beginning of the epoch. The validators also hold
P∗ = {idP1 , idP2 , . . . , idPm}, the set of IDs of the clients.
Also, a function B : P∗×N→ N, that gives the balance of the
corresponding client at a any epoch e, i.e., B(idCi , e) = bi,e,
where bi,e is the balance of the client Ci at epoch e. Among the
validators, the balances function (which can be viewed as an
array), must be equal. We denote individual transactions (plain
text transactions) as a tuple, (Ci, Cj , b), where Ci is the sender,
Cj is the receiver and b the amount. Actual transactions require
a digital signature to ensure that they legitimately come from
the client Ci, so the transactions that are sent to validators
are also tuples, denoted by txl = (Ci, Cj , b, si,j,b), where
si,j,b is the digital signature. They also hold the transactions
queue Qtxn(e) (for the epoch e), that at the beginning of
each epoch is an empty set. As transactions are issued by
clients, they are appended to this set, so it is of the form
Qtxn(e) = {tx1, tx2, . . . , txl}. Lastly, the validators hold bsi
and bri , that are a pair as accumulators for the received and
sent amounts for each client during an epoch. At the beginning
of an epoch, both are equal to zero.
2) Clients: The clients are the nodes that join the protocol
and make use of SC to make off-chain money transfers to other
clients. When a new client wants to join SC, it has to make
an initial deposit to the smart contract, and identify itself with
an ID that is not already part of SC. Also, clients that have
a positive balance on SC, can withdraw their money to have
it returned to MC. When a client that is already part of the
network, wants to leave SC, it has to request its exit, which
automatically issues withdraw for the total of its remaining
balance, then the ITM that represents the client goes to a halt
state.
The clients are responsible of keeping track of its own bal-
ance, and query from the smart contract the necessary elements
(Merkel path) to provide proof of possession, whenever any of
them requiere to withdraw from or exit SC.
For this scheme to work, each client requires to have a
function Bi : N→ N that gives its own balance for any epoch,
i.e., Bi(e) = bi,e, where bi,e is the balance at epoch e for client
Ci. We assume that if a client joined at an epoch k, (i.e., it did
not join since the beginning of the execution), then Bi(k′) = 0
for all k′ < k.
3) Global Ledger: The Global Ledger L is the computing
entity that represents the functionality of MC. It basically
receives the block headers of each of the transaction batches,
to serve as checkpoints for transactions occurred on SC. For
our purposes, we can assume that clients have infinite off-chain
balance, since the security of the mainchain is outside of the
scope.
4) Smart Contract: The Smart Contract C is the computing
entity that controls the execution of the protocol by having
a counter e that holds the current epoch, this counter starts
in 1 at the beginning of the execution. Also, it holds a
function that controls the total money that is flowing in the
protocol at any epoch, bt : N → N, so bt(e) =
∑
i bi,e =∑
iB(idCi , e). It also holds the set of IDs for the validatorsV∗ = {idV1 , idV2 , . . . , idVn}.
The security proof relies on making to any environment,
the real protocol indistinguishable from the ideal functionality
Fig. 11. Ideal protocol I model.
F designed to model how the protocol works, and presented
in section 4. Figure 11 depicts the ideal protocol.
C. UCS Protocol Evolution
The protocol can be in any of the terms of an epoch, as
described on section III-A .
• Collecting Term
• Proposing Term
• Committing Term
• Pending Term
The terms are described below, from the perspective of the
protocol model.
1) Collecting Term: The transaction collect is the term
in which a clients can request transfer of funds to other
clients. This term starts at the execution of the protocol, once
the required machines are invoked in Π, or after a block
has been successfuly commited and accepted. At the start of
the term, the smart contract increases the epoch count, and
starts a counter in tepoch. and each validator updates their
balance registry as B(idCi , e + 1) = bi,e + b
r
i − bsi , sets their
accumulators to zero, bsi = 0 and b
r
i = 0, updates the current
leader index, vcurrent + 1, sets the status flag vstatus = 1 if
vindex = vcurrent, or zero if not, and the set of transactions
queue is initialized as empty, Qtxn(e+ 1) = ∅.
After this, the collecting itself begins. During this, every
validator stores a temporary registry of all the transactions sent
and received by each client by accumulating the amounts of
sent and received money in bsi and b
r
i . Also, the transactions
queue is assembled. The flow of the transactions requests, is
controlled by E . It sequentially sends (turnToTransfer)
to the clients, so they can request transactions to any of the
validators.
For simplicity and for the purposes of the model, we denote
the plain text transactions as (Ci, Cj , b), and consider that there
are three functions: S (sign), V (verify) and H (hash). The H
function returns the hash of the input (if the input is a tuple, it
returns hash of the concatenated elements of the tuple), and the
other two functions are such that si,j,b = S(H(Ci, Cj , b), ki)
is the digital signature for the transaction (with ki being the
private key of Ci), and V ((Ci, Cj , b), si,j,b, idi) = 1 if si,j,b
was indeed created with H(Ci, Cj , b) and ki, and 0 otherwise,
recalling that idi serves both as the ID and public key of the
client Ci.
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When Ci wants to transfer money to Cj , and receives the
turn to do so, Ci randomly selects a validator Vk, and sends
it the message (transferFunds, (Ci, Cj , b), si,j,b). If the
sender and receiver are the same, the operation is terminated.
This is to avoid the risk of a malicious client to purposely
create a loop or a waste network or computing resources.
The validator uses si,j,b and idCi to verify that the transaction
legitimately comes from Ci (if V ((Ci, Cj , b), si,j,b, idi) = 1),
and also verifies that the balance is enough (i.e., B(idCi) −
bsi + b
r
i ≥ b).
If any of the verifications fail, then Vk sends to the request-
ing client (txNotValid) and the operation is terminated.
If both verifications pass, two things happen: it updates the
transaction accumulators as bsi + b and b
r
j + b, and updates the
transactions queue as Qtxn(e) ∪ {txl}, with the transaction
being txl = (Ci, Cj , b, si,j,b). Then, Vk sends the message
(txRequest, (Ci, Cj , b), si,j,b, i) to C for it to increase the
transactions count txn, and sequentially to the rest of the
validators, so the transaction can be added to their local
transactions queue and to increase their local accumulators bsi
and bri . The sequence to send the transactions to the rest of the
validators is such that vcurrent is the last validator that receives
the transaction. This is to control the start of the proposing
term. The message is also sent. After this, the operation is
terminated.
By accumulating the transactions amounts in bsi and b
r
i ,
the validators get the the ease of keeping the actual balances
unchanged, in case the block is rejected and discarded.
2) Proposing Term: If the transactions queue Qtxn(e)
accumulates nmax of elements, or if tmax units of time pass
since the start of the epoch, then the Block Proposal term starts.
The validator for which vstatus = 1. It proceeds to assemble
the block with all the transactions collected in the round, which
are contained in the Qtxn(e) set.
For the purposes of the model, this only involves send-
ing the message (proposedBlock, Be, sBe,l), where Be
is the actual block containing the transactions, and sBe,l =
S(H(Be), kl) is the corresponding digital signature of the
block, to the rest of the validators.
We consider the block itself as a tuple, whose structure is
Be = (e,H(hBe−1), cpe−1, Rtxn, Ra,MTtxn,MTP), where e
is the current epoch, hBe−1 is the header of the previous block
(and H(hBe−1) its hash), cpe−1 is the previous checkpoint,
Rtxn is the Merkle root of the transactions tree, Ra is the
Merkle root of the accounts tree, MTtxn is a n-tuple containing
all the entries of the Merkle tree of the transactions, and
MTP is the n-tuple containing all the entries of the Merkle
tree of the accounts. Since the first five entries of the tuple
are what constitutes the header, the block can be written as
Be = (hBe ,MTtxn,MTP).
For the protocol it is necessary that at least half of the
group of validators approve the block. All the validators,
except for the one executing the transaction, have to reply
to the request with either (blockApproved, sBQ,l′), where
sBQ,l′ is the signature of the block from follower Vl′ , or
(blockNotApproved).
If Vk received less than half of approvals, the epoch
has to be restarted, first with the leader resetting the epoch
transactions by setting bsi = 0, b
r
i = 0 and Qtxn(e) = ∅, and
then by sending (epochRestart) to the rest of the validators
for them to proceed in the same way.
3) Commit Term: The validator Vk collects all the replies,
and if more than half of the validators reply with approval,
then Vk has to send (commit, cpe) to C, recalling that
cpe = (H(Be), QA(H(Bi)), index) is the check point for
epoch e, and QA(H(Bi)) is the aggregate signature for all the
validators that approved the block, created with the signatures
sBQ,l′ from each validator Vl′ that approved the block. Vk also
send that message to the rest of the validators and E , for them
to be aware that a block has been successfuly proposed to C.
When C receives the commit message from the validator
that is the leader of the epoch, it sends (commitReceived)
to the participants, and starts a countdown for a fixed amount
of time ∆ (parameter under control of the smart contract), to
wait for challenge messages.
To proceed to the pending term, C sends
(blockReceived) to E .
4) Pending Term: The pending period, is the period of
time in which several actions can be triggered, by the
clients or validators. For this, upon receiving the message
(blockReceived) by C, E sequentially request any oper-
ation to the validators and to the clients with the message
(turnToTalk). The order in which validators are requested
is the order they take the lead to propose the block, and the
validators in the order in which they joined. Upon receiving
(turnToTalk), the following actions can be triggered.
Deposits. Only can be sent by clients. This is the pro-
cess by which a client Ci transfers money to be used in
SC. For this, a client Ci sends (depositRequest, idCi , x)
to C. After receiving the request, C initiates a transac-
tion on MC to request the amount from Ci. For this, it
sends (depositRequested, idCi , x) to L. If the client
has not enough funds on MC, L replies to C with
(cannotDeposit, idCi , x). Upon receiving the message,
C sends (depositNotReceived, x) to the client Ci and
terminates the operation.
If, on the other hand, the client has enough funds on
MC, L transfers the requested amount to C, and replies
with the message (depositConfirmed, idCi , b). Then C
updates the total balance as bt + b and sends the message
(depositReceived, idCi , b) to all the validators for them
to update the client’s balance as b′ = B(idCi , e) + b and the
balances function B, so that B(idCi , e) = b
′, and to the client
Ci, for it to acknowledge the deposit. After this, the operation
is finished.
If the machine that sends the message for a deposit is the
environment E , it is interpreted as a request from a new client
to join SC, provided the requesting ID is not already a client,
i.e., idCi /∈ P∗. In this case, the process that is followed is
exactly as the one described previously, with the difference
that, when the first validator receives the message to update
the balances, and that ID is new to the protocol, a ITM is
invoked for that particular ID. If E sends the deposit request
with the ID of an existing client, then the process is terminated.
If idCi ∈ P∗, then the validator sends (existingClient)
to E and terminates the operation.
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For this to work, C sends the depositReceived mes-
sage sequentially to the validators in a predetermined way.
Challenges. Since the block content is known for every
participant, all of them are aware of what was submitted to
C, and therefore anyone can issue a challenge message. If
no challenge messages are received within ∆, then this term
ends, with the committed block and checkpoint are assumed to
be accepted by everyone. When this happens both the epoch
counter e and the leader pointer vcurrent are increased in one,
and the collect term starts again.
However, if the submitted check point is invalid from the
perspective of a validator Vk, (because the submitted block has
inconsistencies with the local registry), it sends the message
(challenge, Bk,e−1, w) to C. Bk is a tuple that contains the
information necessary to prove that the current block is incon-
sistent: the hash of the previous checkpoint, and the aggregate
signature of the current block (the one being challenged).
The amount w is subtracted from Vk mainchain account and
transferred to C, this is by requesting (getWager, w, Vk).
After that, C evaluates the proof Bk,e−1. If the verification is
not successful (the provided proof is not consistent with the
submitted block and the hash of the previous check point), then
the operation is terminated, and the wager is not returned. If
the verification is successful, the validator that lead the epoch
is removed from V , C invokes a new machine to replace it V ′l ,
sends (challengeValid, Vl, V ′l ) to the validators to reset
the transactions registry, bsi = 0, b
r
j = 0, Qtxn(e) = ∅, to
restart the epoch.
A very similar process is done, if the challenge comes from
a client Ci. The message is the same, (challenge, PP,w),
except that for clients, the provided information with the
challenge is PP a proof of possesion for the balance of the
previous epoch, and the set of transactions from the current
epoch. If the challenge is successful, the validator is removed
and the wager returned. Otherwise, the wager is lost for the
client, although it remains in the sidechain.
Whitdraws. With this, any client can have some amount
of its balance, returned to MC. For this, the client Ci sends
(withdraw, b, bi,e, hBe−1 ,MPtxn) to the smart contract, (b
being the amount requested to be withdrew, and MPtxn is
the Merkle path to be used for the proof of possession).
Upon receiving the message, the smart contract is in charge of
verifying two things: that the balance is enough and that proof
provided is valid.
If the requested amount is not enough (the client’s balance
is less than the requested amount, bi,e < b), or the provided
proof of possession is not valid, C sends to the client Ci the
message (withdrawNotOK, b), and the operation is termi-
nated.
If on the other hand, the verifications are passed, C updates
the total balance as bt(e) − b, and sends to the validators
the message (withdrawOK, Ci, b), for them to update the
balances function as B(idi, e + 1) = bi,e − b, and to MC L,
for it to transfer b from C to Ci on its on chain account. After
this, the operation is terminated.
Exit. This is the same as the withdraw process, with
the exception that after processing it (if it is successful),
then the client is removed from the protocol, by it going
to a halt state. For this, the client Ci sends the message
(exit, bi,e, hBe−1 ,MPtxn) to the smart contract. Then, C
makes the same two verifications as in a regular withdraw.
If any of those are not are not successful, C sends the
message (cannotExit, b) to the client, and the operation
is terminated.
If the verifications are successful, then C updates
the total balance, bt(e + 1) = bt(e) − bi,e and sends
(clientExit, idCi) to the validators and the requesting
client, for the former to update their clients set as P∗\{idCi},
and to the latter for the client’s Pi ITM to halt. With this, Pi
cannot be activated again during the execution of the protocol,
and its ID cannot be used for a new client. After this, the
operation is terminated
What has been described so far, is the general overview of
the protocol. However, for a full security proof, we have to
create an ideal model that encompass all the functionalities in
a single computing entity F .
D. Security Proof
For the security proof we will use as basis the formal
definitions of the protocol from section IV, by showing that for
any adversary A interacting with the real protocol (Fig. 10),
we can always find a simulator S such that the environment
machine cannot distinguish if it has interacted with the real
protocol Π or the ideal protocol I. The concept of distinction
of one protocol from the other, comes from a vanishing
probability of getting different outputs on the environment
machine, after running with Π or I.
A simplification with respect to the full UCS model, is
that we do not make use of session IDs, since we consider
all interactions to outside entities through the environment E ,
i.e., no machine from the protocol can communicate to outside
machines.
For the proof, we are going to use a constructive approach,
this is, we are going to take the computing entities we
described in appendix VIII-B, and evaluate how the protocol
works interacting with it (as depicted in figure 10)
The UCS model requires that at any point of the execution,
only one machine is active, which means the protocol operates
with a sequential execution and whenever a machine sends
input to or request output from other machine, it stops its
execution and the other machine activates upon getting the
input or upon being requested to compute some output.
To this end, we will consider that the flow of the execution
of the protocol is controlled by the environment as follows.
First, the execution starts when E requests a deposit for a
new client, and there are no machines yet (no validators,
clients, smart contract or global ledger); the input parameter
for the execution is just the amount for this deposit. When
this happens, E invokes the smart contract C machine. Then
C proceeds to process the deposit, but as there are no global
ledger or validators, L and the set of n validators {V1, . . . , Vn}
are invoked at the moment they are required (n being a fixed
predefined parameter by E). When the deposit is confirmed by
L, and the first validator is requested to confirm the deposit
to the first client V1, it invokes the machine for it. Whenever
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a client or a validator is invoked, it generates its own pair of
private and public keys.
As was described, new clients are invoked by validators,
but are triggered by E , by requesting deposits with IDs that are
not in the clients set. The environment, thus, is aware of all the
clients that are in the sidechain and the order in which they
joined. We consider then, that the environment sequentially,
and in the same order, sends messages to the clients asking
if they require to make any movement (deposit, withdraw,
transaction or exit). With this, we keep the sequential nature
of the protocol, while having the scheme working as described
before.
We also consider that the protocol execution finishes when
there is just one client left and it requests to exit. Lastly,
the output of the environment machine is as follows: 1 if the
last withdraw to exit is successful (this is, the last client left
the sidechain by providing a correct proof of possession for
the remaining balance on the smart contract), and 0 if this
withdrawal is not successful, since under these circumstances,
at some point something went wrong. The output of the
environment machine is the value that is written to its output
tape when it halts.
Recall the security assumption is that at most n2 − 1
validators could be potentially dishonest. First, we consider
the case when the protocol running is I against an adversary
A.
The ideal functionality F keeps n internal registries, one
for each validator. Considering the security assumption, only
at most n2 −1 of these registries can be tampered by the action
of the adversary A, through backdoor messages to F . Now, to
avoid testing the protocol against all possible adversaries A,
it suffices to make it interact with the “dummy adversary”
D, since if a protocol I UC-emulates another protocol Π
with respect to the dummy adversary, then I UC-emulates Pi
against any adversary [10]. The dummy adversary, basically
allows E to takes over the communication links beteween the
machines, this is done by acting as a buffer between E and all
clients in the protocol: if D receives a message from E to be
delivered to any participant, it sends it as a backdoor message
to the intended participant. And if D receives a backdoor
message, it delivers it to E . This is, if E wants to attack
any participant, it does it via D, and any response that D
gets, is forwarded to E . This attacks, in general, are messages
to modify any of the information flowing in the protocol:
transactions, deposits or withdraws amounts.
The internal registries are, however, protected by the se-
curity features that the real protocol counterpart: the block is
still composed using hashes, and transactions are still signed. A
consequence of this, the probability of finishing the execution
of the protocol with a zero output is null:
Assuming that at most n2 − 1 registries have been com-
promised by the adversary, the block composing term could
be carried out with compromised information. However, the
verification process has to check among the n registries, and
after finding inconsistencies in more than half, the block would
be discarded. This is also true if one or more of the registries
have been modified maliciously for the benefit of one or
more malicious clients. This feature, prevents double spending,
which in turn would cause the protocol to output 0 upon fishing
its execution.
Now, we turn our attention to the protocol Π. Lets consider
any adversary A. We are going to build a simulator S in the
following way. S internally will run an instance of A and
another machine, SD. This machine will serve as interface
from A to send and receive backdoor messages to and from
any participant of Π. A is connected to E to receive or
send messages, and to SD. Essentially: (1) When S is sent a
message by E , it runs the internal instance of A. If the output
message is intended for one of the participants, it is delivered
to SD, and it sends it to that participant as backdoor. If the
output message is intended to E , it is delivered to it. (2) When
S is sent a backdoor message by any of the participants, it is
delivered to the internal instance of A, and the resulting output
is handled in the same way.
With this construction, we have replicated a subset of
functions of the dummy adversary: while D gives full control
to E to perform any kind of attacks, S encompass only some
of the attacks that may be possible, limited by what A can do.
As in the case of the ideal protocol, the execution is
protected by the security properties defined, so the probability
of getting a 0 as an execution output is also null. With this, it
becomes indistinguishable for E to detect if the protocol that
run, was Π or I.
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